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Encounters between phenomenology and cognitive science are nowadays no lon-
ger a novelty. The decades that have passed since Hubert L. Dreyfus told MIT re-
searchers that they could learn something by reading Being and Time have seen the 
rise of a flourishing discourse that has become greater than the sum of its parts. 
Recent times have seen what began as a primarily critical interaction, with various 
authors (including Dreyfus himself) drawing upon phenomenological accounts 
to reject computational models of the mind and the quest for what Haugeland 
called ‘Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence’, develop into a more construc-
tive, positive discourse that seeks to unite the disciplines in mutually-enriching 
research projects.2 Various streams within the contemporary study and philoso-
phy of cognition draw upon the resources of the phenomenological tradition to 
anchor, substantiate or flesh out their accounts of cognition as always-already 
situated and purposive. Given the prominent role that Heidegger’s account of 
Being-in-the-world played within the initial movement of phenomenological cri-
tique, the question of how it might most fruitfully engage with what we could call 
the ‘positive turn’ towards a collaborative dialogue between phenomenology and 
cognitive science presents itself with a natural urgency.3
One way of answering this, of course, would be to deny or at least doubt the fea-
sibility of such a constructive partnership. There is, after all, a continuing debate 
about the possibility of reconciling naturalist and phenomenological perspectives 
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in general, to which the project of Being and Time adds complications of its own. 
This paper, however, will proceed from a different starting point. It will set aside 
these more basic doubts, granting that a cooperation of this nature is possible and 
worth pursuing for the sake of exploring what kind of approach to cognition then 
offers itself as a suitable interlocutor for Heidegger’s early phenomenology.
My goal here is to suggest that one particularly apposite candidate for joining in 
a Heideggerian conversation can be found in the enactivist tradition. Enactiv-
ism has a long history of phenomenological entanglements. These have, however, 
focussed largely upon the work of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty; the potential for 
bringing a Heideggerian perspective to bear upon this intersection of perspec-
tives has often been hinted at, but rarely developed.4 I want to show here why I 
think that there are compelling reasons for exploring that partnership and striv-
ing towards something like a Heideggerian enactivism. My case will hinge on two 
main claims: firstly, that the emphasis upon the inextricable intertwining of agent 
and world renders enactive models of cognition particularly congenial to a mutu-
ally enriching dialogue with Heidegger’s account of purposiveness; and, secondly, 
that the temporal structures of the enaction of meaning resonate profoundly with 
Heidegger’s model of the relation between temporality and practice. In drawing 
out these points of intersection, however, I am seeking not so much to summarise 
an inquiry as to motivate it. This paper endeavours to participate in a conversa-
tion that can be taken much further once the topic has been established. Con-
comitantly, my discussion operates within certain limits. On the one hand, the 
need for defining the connections that I wish to illuminate necessitates that I take 
an interpretive rather than interrogative approach to each of the perspectives I 
discuss. On the other, my aim of rendering these junctures visible precludes a 
detailed investigation of the further insights and especially the tensions that they 
can generate. I will have done all I hope to do here if the notion of a sustained 
Heideggerian enactivism intrigues as a path worth exploring.
1. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ENACTIVISM
The enactivist tradition originated in the study of biology, arising as a response 
to the enduring question of what defines life.5 Its distant philosophical ancestors 
can be found in the philosophies of biology and life advanced by thinkers such as 
Jakob von Uexküll and Hans Jonas, who affirmed the inseparable connection be-
tween an organism and its environment, and posited that the former encountered 
the latter in terms of significance defined by its own concerns, chief among which 
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was the crucial striving for survival.6 In their landmark review of enactivist cogni-
tive science, Froese and Ziemke note that the discourse was influenced heavily by 
von Uexküll’s emphasis upon self-perpetuation as a characteristic distinguishing 
living from non-living entities, and by his theory of the Umwelt—the environment 
which an organism encounters in ways uniquely shaped by its perceptual appara-
tuses, and upon which it depends, not only in order to persist, but to be the kind 
of entity it is in the first place.7 Meanwhile, the thought of Jonas, a student of Hei-
degger, offered the insight that living organisms were not only distinguished by 
self-perpetuation, but a form thereof that a) is metabolic in its exchanges with the 
environment and b) has to contend against the possibility of annihilation (rather 
than something just continuing by default because there is no threat, no way that 
it could cease to be). This means that the organism cannot be understood as what 
it is in abstraction from its environment. That is, for Jonas, the environment en-
ables the organism to be what it is by being that against which the organism de-
fines itself, that which means that the organism is something rather than nothing 
by making real the possibility of such nothingness as well as providing the condi-
tions and material for the nature of the something.
The inception of the enactivist approach as we know it today can be traced to 
the publication of Autopoiesis and Cognition by Francisco Varela and Humberto 
Maturana, which outlined what the authors—then working in theoretical biol-
ogy—took to be the set of conditions defining biological life.8 There, Varela and 
Maturana proposed that a system is alive if it displays what they call autopoiesis, 
meaning that it is a distinct self-unity that generates its own identity and main-
tains itself against the threat of disintegration, with its components producing 
and reproducing the processes that produce them.9 An autopoietic system is au-
tonomous,10 in that it is its own product; it does not exist in order to bring about 
something else, to accomplish some externally-defined end, but rather to be and 
perpetuate itself—its identity is its task. This identity is not, however, cut off 
from that outside itself; indeed, in producing itself and “the topological domain 
of its realization as such a network”, it is fundamentally coupled with that against 
which its identity is defined and with which it must engage in order to be the 
kind of system that maintains itself.11 A system that is never perturbed, to use a 
favourite term of Maturana’s, is not an autonomous identity; in the words of Va-
rela, “a universe comes into being when a space is severed in two”12—the identity 
of the system cannot exist without that against which it defines itself; it and its 
other produce and define one another in an extricable symbiosis. The autopoietic 
system’s interaction with the space within and against which it maintains itself 
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cannot be defined in terms of “inputs or outputs”, for it is much more intimate 
than such an exchange.13 This is not a kind of system that is left unmarked by 
something passing through; rather, it is a balanced self-organising whole that en-
counters  ‘perturbations’ with its entirety, responding holistically to a situation in 
terms of its own self-production.
Autopoiesis was originally conceived as a defining feature of very basic organic 
structures and the parts thereof, rather than describing anything occurring at 
the macro-level of, say, consciousness or experience. Indeed, both Maturana and 
Varela initially strongly resisted the extension of their concepts to any domains 
outside of biology.14 However, the usefulness of their framework in analysing a 
diverse range of systems (including, for example, social groupings), coupled with 
Varela’s own turn towards adapting autopoietic theory into a model of embodied 
perception and activity, led to it being applied across the broad spectrum of phe-
nomena associated with cognition, from its simplest building blocks and mani-
festations—such as in single-celled organisms—to the complex behaviours of hu-
man beings. This discourse developed into what we now call enactivism through 
the publication, in 1991, of The Embodied Mind, which Varela co-authored with 
Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. There, autopoiesis became the foundation 
for an account of human cognition that took the latter to be always-already situ-
ated, embodied and—crucially—active, such that practice and movement came 
to be seen as crucial to perception and consciousness. That text also saw Varela 
and his collaborators embarking upon a comprehensive engagement with the 
phenomenological tradition that had long influenced Varela’s thought, a dialogue 
that would later turn to examine its own ambitions and limits in the collection 
published as Naturalizing Phenomenology.15
In addition to motivating a more explicit intersection with phenomenological 
thought, this transition from defining basic life to analysing human cognition also 
prompted the refinement of enactivism’s conceptual repertoire, as autopoiesis 
came to be seen as insufficient to fully capture the complexity of what enactivists 
take cognition to be. Most significant for my present purposes is the development 
of a notion that Ezequiel Di Paolo, arguably one of the movement’s most notable 
contemporary proponents, calls adaptivity.16 Adaptivity here denotes an autopoi-
etic system’s ability to track its progress against the standard set by the condi-
tions required for its continued existence and flourishing, and is now increasingly 
taken to constitute a further key condition defining what it means for an organism 
to be a cogniser. This brings to the fore the dynamic, fluid nature of organismic 
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self-production that is at the heart of enactive cognition. In isolation, autopoi-
esis constitutes a binary condition, an either/or of survival or disintegration. An 
adaptive autopoietic organism, however, is capable of more than just absolute 
presence or absence—it can do better or worse; it can keep annihilation just far 
enough from itself, with its distance from the point of no return now a variable 
upon which a great deal hinges; it can generate norms that govern its patterns of 
responsiveness to perturbations and other circumstances.
Enactivism sees cognition itself as an inherently relational process, a mutual 
shaping between organism and environment that generates—or enacts—a mean-
ingful world determined by the goals, needs and capacities of the former. The sit-
uation in which a particular organism finds itself is meaningful in relation to the 
organism’s needs and goals, the most fundamental of which is to sustain its own 
existence in the face of factors that could dissolve its self-identity. At a very basic 
level, for example, accumulations of chemicals and particular configurations of 
matter only become ‘nutrients’/’food’ and ‘sharp objects’/’danger’ from the per-
spective of an organism to which these things matter because they are benefits 
or risks to its self-perpetuation. This enaction of meaning (which can, of course, 
become very complex for higher-level organisms) produces and structures the or-
ganism’s world, which in turn is defined as a network of interrelated significances 
that are determined by the various purposes of the organism and its underlying 
concern for self-perpetuation.
2. TRACES OF IMPLIED POTENTIAL: ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN 
HEIDEGGERIAN AND ENACTIVIST PERSPECTIVES
Now that basic introductions have been made, so to speak, and we have some idea 
of what the enactivist perspective entails, I want to bring Heidegger back into the 
conversation. Before I move on to show just why I think that these two are such 
suitable interlocutors for one another, however, I want to highlight the promise 
and urgency of their potential partnership by drawing out some of the brief, tan-
talising meetings they have already shared.  While the promise of a ‘full-blown’ 
Heideggerian enactivism has not been taken up in the literature, it is important to 
note that the discourses have often intersected with one another in various ways, 
arguably rendering the lack of a sustained engagement all the more puzzling.
One significant point of contact lies in the philosophical connections that enactiv-
ism and Heideggerian phenomenology share through the work of von Uexküll and 
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Jonas. Jonas was—as I noted earlier—a student of Heidegger’s. The Phenomenon 
of Life, the work of his that had the greatest influence upon contemporary enac-
tivism, engages with Heidegger’s thought as both a positive source of insight and 
an antagonist.17 Von Uexküll’s work, meanwhile, was widely read by participants 
in the phenomenological tradition—including Heidegger himself, who wrote ap-
provingly of the biologist’s affirmation of the importance of “the relational struc-
ture between the animal and its environment”.18 While the Heideggerian perspec-
tive that I am interested in reconciling with enactivism is the one outlined in 
Being and Time, it is interesting to note that Heidegger later, in The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics, identified von Uexküll’s work as one of two “essential 
steps” which could help biology progress to a phenomenologically-sound concep-
tualisation of life, the organism and the environment.19 Heidegger goes so far as to 
say that his phenomenology could offer the kind of “radical interpretation” of von 
Uexküll’s ideas that would lend them “the fundamental significance they could 
have”, and that “the engagement with concrete investigations like this is one of 
the most fruitful things that philosophy can learn from contemporary biology.”20
This is not, of course, uncomplicated praise. In that same work, Heidegger also 
strongly differentiates his concept of ‘world’ from von Uexküll’s Umwelt and, cru-
cially, rejects the latter’s insistence upon a continuity between humans and non-
human animals—a contention that, indeed, points to a more general challenge for 
the pursuit of a Heideggerian enactivism. The range of entities upon which each 
discourse focuses (and the kinds of entities to which they are willing to attribute 
the structures that are central to their respective models of world navigation) 
arguably differ enough to generate significant tension between Heideggerian and 
enactivist approaches. I do not think, however, that this tension fatally under-
mines the prospect of dialogue, for reasons that I can only touch upon very briefly 
here. Enactivism is a well-matched partner for Heidegger’s early phenomenology, 
not only because of their conceptual sympathies, but because of the gaps and un-
derutilised resources that each reveals in the other. Here, I would suggest that this 
friction invites us to reconsider how we think a broadly Heideggerian framework 
must conceptualise the distinction between human and non-human animals. The 
resonances between Heideggerian structures and the model of the enactive cog-
niser serve as one starting point for a re-imagining of the ways in which an entity 
might participate in the former. Further exploration of this is beyond the scope of 
what I can hope to do here; for now, all that I wish to draw out is that the complex 
history that Heideggerian and enactivist ideas share in itself provides significant 
motivation for a deeper, prolonged dialogue.21
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Interactions between enactivist and Heideggerian discourses have not, of course, 
been limited to their mutual entanglements with the philosophy of biology; there 
have also been more recent and direct encounters. As I noted earlier, enactiv-
ism has a significant history of engaging with the phenomenological tradition, 
albeit primarily in the form of Husserl’s work and, more recently, that of Mer-
leau-Ponty.22 Here, Heideggerian thought is by no means ignored; it is often men-
tioned—mostly, however, as part of general lists of frameworks sympathetic to 
situated cognition, or of examples of phenomenological thought. That is, it is not 
explored in much detail.23 I think that one can discern a pattern of almost-but-
not-quite meetings between the perspectives which flows onwards through much 
of the contemporary literature. There are many dialogues between enactivists and 
Heideggerians, but these are generally not about the relation between enactiv-
ism and Heideggerian phenomenology itself.24 When Heideggerian concepts are 
discussed, they are dealt with in isolation and often quite briefly.25 What we have, 
then, is something of a precedent that tempts further exploration—an existing 
set of entanglements and glancing connections whose very elusiveness makes the 
possibility of a prolonged encounter all the more promising. An entwined history 
is not, of course, the primary reason that I want to offer here in urging that this 
potential be realised. The stronger motivation for bringing these perspectives to-
gether lies in their conceptual sympathies; it is to a discussion of these that I shall 
now turn.
3. GESTURES TOWARDS A HEIDEGGERIAN ENACTIVISM I: BEING-IN-
THE-WORLD AND THE ENACTION OF MEANING
I want to suggest that the phenomenology of purposiveness that Heidegger offers 
us in Being and Time and its contemporaneous texts resonates with the enactiv-
ist model of life and cognition, intersecting at points that can serve as both con-
necting anchors and sites of illuminating friction. Here, I shall focus on two such 
nodes. These are, firstly, the manner in which each framework conceptualises the 
relation between the world and the entity that navigates it; and, secondly, the re-
lation between temporality and practice that operates either directly or implicitly 
within each model.
Turning first to the matter of the entity-world relation, I want to suggest that the 
enactivist view of cognition as an inherently relational process resonates with the 
Heideggerian conception of Being-in-the-world through, on the one hand, shar-
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ing its insistence upon the inseparable entanglement of entity and world, and, on 
the other, striking a comparable balance between undermining the subject-world 
dichotomy and maintaining the distinctiveness of the worlded entity. Enactivism 
and Heidegger’s account both describe the relation between entity and world as 
one that is mutually constitutive and inextricably interdependent. Each aspect 
renders the other intelligible; each is an enabling condition of the other and, in-
deed, part of the very definition of what it is to be as it is. The world is, for both 
discourses, conceived as more than a mere set of environmental circumstances; 
it is a network of purposive significance generated and oriented by the entity’s 
purposes, needs and capacities.  Conversely, for both frameworks, the entity in 
question is only what it is through having a world; neither can be what it is apart 
from the other, such that ‘apartness’ here is not even intelligible.
Recall that, for Heidegger, the way that Dasein relates to its world must not be 
understood in terms of the latter containing the former; of a subject covering a 
pre-determined, value and purpose-indifferent objecthood with a merely super-
ficial cloak of salience and meaning; of a transaction between two bounded and 
separable realms, a fragile congress whose very conceivability must be secured 
by proofs anchoring one utterly different pole to the other.26 “Dasein is its world” 
(BT, 416 [364]). Here, we find a sharing of Being; Dasein’s world is part of the 
ontological structure of its very way of Being. Being-in-the-world is an indivisible 
relation whose constituents cannot even truly be labelled such, for this would im-
ply the adhesion of potentially distinct parts. Dasein would not be without world, 
and world is structured by Dasein, for its worldhood is constituted in relation to 
the network of purposive significance oriented around Dasein’s projective means-
ends directedness. Dasein does not encounter a blank, brute given that it imbues 
with “subjective colouring” (BT, 101 [71]), but a contexture inviting and shaped by 
practical engagement, entities defined in terms of either their equipmental role 
or lack thereof.
The enactivist tradition arguably depicts the interconnection between cognising 
entities and their world in a comparable way. The enacting cogniser is defined by 
its world-generation and concomitant capacity to respond to the significances it 
produces; it only comes into being through its relation to circumstances which 
it must navigate.27 For enactivists, cognition is inherently situated, rather than a 
context-independent transaction between the enclosed and potentially isolable 
spheres of minded computation and external worldly stimuli. It is the sense-mak-
ing interaction between a self-perpetuating system and its environment, enacting 
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a meaningful world that in turn continues to shape the system itself. Neither the 
autonomous cogniser nor the world that it both generates and interacts with to 
generate itself can be conceived as what they are apart from one another or their 
role in this interplay.28 Such a cogniser does not encounter a value-neutral set of 
properties and parameters; it navigates a world of meaning defined by its needs 
and self-concern. It does not encounter a certain quantity of particular chemicals, 
but rather enough (or too little or a surplus of) nutrition; it does not meet ag-
gregates of matter, but obstacles or tools. This world is only meaningful, is only 
what it is, from and for the perspective of an identity that is concerned for its 
self-perpetuation and encounters its environs in terms of what helps or hinders 
its flourishing; the world is for the sake of the worlded entity..
At the same time, however, both discourses also imply that this rejection of the 
entity-world (or, should we be willing to take up the additional conceptual bag-
gage of such a term, the subject-world) dichotomy need not entail the complete 
loss of a distinctive locus of concern. I would argue that Heideggerian and en-
activist analyses both urge us to take account of the need for a perspective from 
which and for which the world is oriented, an entity that renders the notion of a 
world structured by ends and needs intelligible—for these must be had by some-
thing. Dasein is not positioned over-against its world, or isolable from it, but it is 
also not equivalent in kind to the tool-relations and functional significations that 
constitute the latter (BT, 67-71, 78-86 ff [41-450, 53-59 ff]). Tool-use is integral to 
Dasein’s manifestation of its way of Being, but Dasein is not equipment or a tool-
relation; it is differentiated from other entities by the very understanding of Being 
that enables it to understand their ways of Being and engage with them (BT, 27-32 
[7-12]). Heidegger’s account challenges us, I think, to see the relation of Dasein 
and world as a unity that at the same time does not dissolve either or equivocate 
one to the other; they cannot be separated, and yet there is in Dasein that under-
standing and concern of Being which orients the structures of the world, which 
render worldhood possible. For the enactivist perspective, meanwhile, there is 
also an emphasis upon the inseparable integration of the cognising agent and its 
context without surrendering the ability to define or insist upon a locus of pur-
pose around which the significance generated by the interaction of a being and its 
environment is oriented. The generation and maintenance of a distinct self-unity 
is, after all, that which defines autopoiesis, that which constitutes a necessary 
condition for both life and cognition. Enactivism defines cognition in terms of the 
system’s very ability to maintain a boundary—albeit porous, structural and func-
tional (rather than spatial), and mutually constituted by the world it generates—
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and to persist as an autonomous unity; there must be that which can enact. This 
identity is not static; it can be in a state of flux through the changing couplings 
with its environment and its crucial responsiveness and adaptability in the face 
of perturbations; however, there must be something to which we can attribute a 
concern for its continuation and through which the very notion of flourishing in 
the face of threats against itself—indeed, of a threat as such, of the possibility of 
disintegration—attains meaning. The enactivist framework, then, is an attractive 
potential interlocutor for Heideggerian phenomenology because both—in their 
own ways, distinctly yet harmonically—emphasise the interrelation of entity and 
world without thereby surrendering the ability to speak of a centre of purpose 
for and through whom that meaning is generated. “Dasein is its world” (BT, 416 
[364]), and its world is structured by the functional significations defined in rela-
tion to Dasein’s purposes, yet Dasein is also that nexus of concern for whose sake 
purposive significations are laid out. For enactivism, too, the entity at issue, the 
protagonist of its tale, is not itself—is, indeed, not at all—apart from its environ-
ment and the world it enacts, just as that world is constituted by relationally-
generated meanings; cognition is a complex, inextricable mutual entanglement. 
Yet there is that locus which renders the very notion of the significance emerging 
through cognition intelligible, something to which the conditions it faces matter, 
in relation to which the meaning brought about by enaction is defined. This reso-
nance is, I think, particularly significant if we consider the context within which 
many recent debates about the relation between phenomenology and cognitive 
science take place. The kind of cognitive science that is most often involved in 
discussions about such potential partnerships is one for whom cognition is not 
‘skull-bound’, and one that takes claims about the situatedness of the cogniser 
and the immediacy of the world to mean that we must challenge the relevance of 
believing in an agent who is at all distinct from that which they navigate. I think 
that the view of the Dasein-world relation that I have set out places constrains 
what kind of model of cognition Heideggerian phenomenology can engage with, 
in that I think it demands it be partnered with an approach that rejects an entity-
world opposition without losing sight of something that relates, of a Being to 
whom this relation matters and that is constituted by it. I think that the enactive 
approach fulfils this requirement remarkably well.29 That is, if we think that pur-
suing a dialogue between Heideggerian phenomenology and contemporary cog-
nitive science is a worthwhile endeavour, then the conceptual sympathy between 
the former and enactivist forms of the latter for which I have tried to argue here 
can, I would say, serve as a significant reason for settling upon enactivism as a 
fitting match.
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4. GESTURES TOWARDS A HEIDEGGERIAN ENACTIVISM II: 
TEMPORALITY AND ENACTION
The second of the two ‘nodes’ of intersection between the discourses that I want 
to explore here originates in the way that temporality operates in both accounts.30 
I shall suggest that a Heideggerian model of temporality profoundly resonates 
with the temporal dimension of meaning-enacting cognition to such an extent 
that we can read the former, not as a structure foreign to and hence imposed 
upon the latter, but as already structuring it in a sense. That is, the temporality of 
enaction is already proto-Heideggerian in a way that clears a space for dialogue 
between them and invites us to bring the two frameworks together. 
4.a. Heidegger’s Model of Temporality
Making this connection between Heidegger’s conception of temporality and the 
temporal dimension operative in enactivism visible will require that I first devote 
some space to summarising my reading of the account of temporality offered in 
Being and Time  and its contemporaries.31 Since offering a more comprehensive 
description or analysis thereof would far exceed the space that I have here, I will 
focus on roughly sketching out what I take to be three vitally significant charac-
teristics of the way in which Heidegger deals with temporality—ones that, I shall 
suggest later, we can also recognise in the kind of temporality involved in the 
enactivist view of cognition. These features are, firstly, a complex, inextricable 
entanglement with purposiveness; secondly, an emphasis upon radical futurity; 
and, finally, a fundamental connection to self-concern. 
4.a.i. Purposiveness
It is my contention that, for the Heidegger of Being and Time, the relation between 
purposiveness and temporality needs to be conceived as a complex reciprocity, 
in which each element shapes the other; temporality unifies and enables prac-
tice and purposiveness, even as it is itself inherently affected by the latter. If we 
were to take his text at face value, then the necessity of temporality to practical 
engagement can be captured in the profound yet simple notion of a foundation-
al relation: temporality unifies and underlies practical engagement. According 
to Heidegger, temporality, as a fundamental condition of the possibility of our 
experience, unifies all the structures that comprise our particular way of Being, 
which includes Being-in-the-world. Temporality is the crucial glue binding all the 
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elements and processes that Heidegger ascribes to our existence into a coherent 
whole, providing “the unitary basis for its existential possibility”; it “regulates the 
possible unity of all Dasein’s existential structures” (BT, 402 [351]).
I would argue, however, that Heidegger’s account also suggests—even if it does 
not do so explicitly—that we must conceive of temporality itself in purposive 
terms. That is, temporality does not just ground practical engagement while it-
self remaining untouched by that connection; the latter also shapes the former, 
to the extent that temporality itself cannot be understood adequately without 
taking purposiveness into account. Consider, for example, Heidegger’s insistence 
upon the horizonal nature of temporality. The ‘horizon’ is that towards which 
temporality reaches and projects. Each modality or, in Heidegger’s terminology, 
ecstasis of temporality (past, present and future) has a Wohin, a where or whither 
to “which one is carried away”, which Heidegger also calls the “horizonal schema” 
(BT, 416 [365]). This schema is different for each ecstasis.32 This horizonal schema 
of each ecstasis is defined in what I would call intrinsically purposive terms. The 
horizonal schema of the present ecstasis is the in-order-to—the assignment that 
defines the character of equipment and its role in a network of tasks, functions 
and other equipment. 33 The horizonal schema of the past is that upon which Da-
sein is thrown or abandoned, cashed out by Heidegger in terms of Dasein having 
“been delivered over to entities which it needs in order to be able to be as it is” 
(BT, 416 [364]). That is, in order to realise its directedness towards its ends, to-
wards itself as the ultimate sake of its ends, Dasein must deal or engage with other 
entities. Finally, the horizonal schema of the future is given by Heidegger as the 
‘for-the-sake-of-which’, the primordial self-concern, the acting and striving for 
the sake of itself, for the sake of its own being, that orients the various networks 
of practical significance that constitute Dasein’s world and its navigation there-
of. Stating that the future of original temporality “is carried away”34 towards this 
for-the-sake-of-which renders the former fundamentally purposive. It means that 
the ecstatic outwardness of the future stretches towards an intrinsic mattering, 
a sake, a purpose that is enacted in Dasein’s existence as an ability to be. Dasein’s 
relation towards its Being is, after all, a “competence”, a capability, that is not 
“something by way of an extra” for Dasein, but its “Being-possible. Dasein is in ev-
ery case what it can be, and in the way in which it is its possibility” (BT, 183 [143]).
These horizonal schemata are crucial to originary temporality functioning in the 
manner that Heidegger’s account requires it to. According to Heidegger, we can-
not understand temporality without taking into account its fundamental, radi-
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cal openness, its outward-directedness. It is this that enables Dasein’s transcen-
dence, the always-already being outside of itself—and being enmeshed with other 
entities—that underlies the very having of a world and constitutes the ever-prior 
letting-be through which the possibility of everything Dasein encounters must 
already be disclosed.35 This reaching-outwards reaches towards something, proj-
ects upon that which in turn renders that which is projected and the projecting 
itself intelligible, a structuration that we must acknowledge if we are to properly 
conceive of temporality and its functioning; to do temporality justice, as it were, 
we must address its openness, and to do the latter requires responding to it as 
horizonal. If we cannot understand temporality (and its role in constituting our 
way of Being) without understanding its horizonal nature, and if the horizons of 
temporality are intrinsically purposive, then we cannot understand temporality 
adequately without considering it in purposive terms.
4.a.ii. Radical Futurity
Heidegger’s account is also, I think, characterised by giving the future—cashed 
out in terms of a radical and projective openness—a particularly important place 
in the structure of temporality. This point can be broken down into two distinct 
but interrelated claims. These are, firstly, that Heidegger’s model of temporal-
ity privileges the futural mode of temporality; and secondly, that this futurity is 
conceived in terms of a radical indeterminacy. I will briefly lay out each of these 
in turn.
With respect to the first of these points, it is worth noting that Being and Time as-
serts the special importance of futurity quite explicitly. For example, Heidegger 
writes that the reason that he has “always mentioned the future first” is that it 
“has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality”, 
such that the future is the latter’s “primary phenomenon” (BT, 378 [329]). The 
text gives us two reasons for this prioritisation of the future: the futural ecstasis 
renders possible the anticipatory resoluteness and Being-towards-death that con-
stitute authenticity and are crucial to the structure of Care, and it is intrinsically 
connected to Dasein’s existentiality. It is the latter, arguably less apparent point 
that I want to draw out here. Heidegger writes that “[s]elf-projection upon the 
‘for-the-sake-of-itself ’ is grounded in the future and is an essential characteris-
tic of existentiality. The primary meaning of existentiality is the future” (BT, 375-376 
[327], original italics). Recall that existentiality refers to the defining feature of 
Dasein’s way of Being, that is, its comportment towards its own Being, its under-
246 · marilyn stendera  
standing itself “in terms of a possibility of itself” (BT, 33 [12]). For Heidegger, 
this understanding of and concern for its own Being that makes Dasein what it 
is, and its capacity to stretch towards possibilities for and of itself, are inherently 
and primarily futural. Blattner captures this well when he notes that temporality 
“is the ontological sense of Dasein as ability, as something that presses ahead into 
its self-understanding”.36 This privileging of Dasein’s projection ahead, beyond, 
into possibility gives the futural dimension of temporality an extraordinary sig-
nificance. Dasein is a primordially futural way of Being—not in a sense of being 
disconnected from past, present or the unity of the three ecstases, but rather in 
that futurity guides Dasein’s structuration through the very unity in which the 
future partakes.
This futurity is not one that can be captured in terms of prediction or a concrete 
anticipation of a determinate goal; this brings us to the second of the two claims 
that I put forward at the start of this section. Heidegger often emphasises that the 
projection of a Worumwillen, the stretching outwards into possibilities, does not 
equate to having a particular goal in mind, whether thematically or otherwise.37 
Even in the case of specific concrete practices, the particular goal of a specific 
task orients the activity and tools engaged with in its accomplishment, but is not 
always held in mind or focussed upon. Heidegger distinguishes the directedness 
towards an end from the attainment thereof, and, indeed, its concretisation or 
determination. This view of purposive end-directedness, coupled with the notion 
of the originary future as the underlying openness that discloses realms of Being 
as such, gives us a conception of futurity as radical indeterminacy. The futural 
is, for Heidegger, an open stretching outwards that is not centred around, nor 
caught up in the striving for the realisation of, anything determinate. This is an 
indeterminacy that enables determinacy, grounding the possibility of making and 
conceiving of particular choices.
4.a.iii. Self-Concern
The final of the three characteristics of Heidegger’s account that I wish to high-
light here is the connection that it draws between temporality, practice and the 
self-concern of Dasein.  It is this self-concern that defines, and is defined by, futu-
rity and therefore also suffuses Dasein’s coming-towards-itself as it takes over its 
having-been.38 This relation between temporality and self-concern is one of each 
shaping and being shaped by the other. On the one hand, that anything can mat-
ter to Dasein is due to its temporal nature, for, according to Heidegger, only an 
being-in-the-world, temporality and autopoiesis · 247 
entity structured by a unity of past, present and future can stretch towards pos-
sibilities of its own, towards itself as possibility, can encounter anything as having 
a sake—and can be directed towards its own Being as the sake for which it does 
anything.39 On the other, it is this mattering, this capacity to pursue self-concern 
and the ripples of what we might call the more concrete ‘sub-concerns’ of practice 
that shapes temporality itself, as we have seen. Heidegger’s account implies that 
Dasein’s self-concern and its concomitant pursuit of related concerns are insepa-
rable from, and crucial to, temporality.
4.b. The Heideggerian Temporality of Enaction
Heidegger’s account, then, invites us to understand purposiveness as inherently 
temporal and temporality as shaped by purposiveness; to view the futural dimen-
sion as having a special significance, one that can be cashed out in terms of a 
radical indeterminacy that transcends mere predictive or anticipatory models of 
futurity; and, finally, to take temporality as being structured by and structuring 
the self-concern that defines Dasein. I now want to suggest that the autopoietic 
enacting of meaning carries within itself a temporality that also and already bears 
a similar shape. Guided by the three features that I have set out above, I think that 
we can trace the outlines of a Heideggerian temporal structuration within enac-
tivism, suggesting the kind of deep resonance between the two approaches that 
calls for a more extensive dialogue between them.
Firstly, I would argue that the autopoietic enacting of meaning also displays the 
kind of complex mutual shaping of temporality and purposiveness that we can 
find in Heidegger’s account. On the one hand, the purposiveness underlying en-
action is unintelligible from an atemporal perspective.40 The self-generation and 
maintenance of an autonomous self-unity must happen across time. After all, the 
organism’s purposive aiming towards the overall end of survival, as well as its 
more immediate needs in successfully navigating environmental circumstances, 
are structured by a directedness towards something which has not been reached 
yet, and end that is not meaningful apart from an integration into the organism’s 
overall temporal stretching into past and future. This temporal continuum ren-
ders the system’s present situation intelligible, for it is the same self-unity that 
has existed previously and been shaped by particular past circumstances whose 
continuance is at stake here. The world of significance enacted in collaboration 
with the environment is a temporal one. On the other hand, the temporality of en-
action is itself thoroughly purposive, for it is manifested and has meaning in terms 
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of means-ends directedness, of the purposive carrying over of a past identity into 
the future as, both, a goal to be striven for, and the motivation of immediate ends.
Secondly, I think that we can also read the temporality of autopoietic cognition 
in future-weighted terms. The meaningful world generated by the activity of the 
organism in collaboration with its environment is arguably defined by an orienta-
tion towards futurity, in that the future survival of the system that provides the 
framework for all its actions and the salience that it produces in conjunction with 
the situations it encounters. Moreover, it is the directedness towards more imme-
diate goals thrown up by the perturbations it undergoes that renders its activity 
intelligible as cognition. The survival of the organism is not merely a simple not-
yet that is to be anticipated or drawn out in a concrete plan, however. This is a fu-
ture that will never arrive or be finally accomplished. It is an ongoing futurity that 
orients everything else, and that can never be closed off, for the striving towards 
it can only end, not with being grasped or secured (for these are not possible) 
but with the annihilation of the framework that it rendered meaningful, with the 
disintegration of the system. For the autopoietic, adaptive system, stasis is death; 
there is no endpoint, only the ultimate ceasing of those processes of resistance 
and precariousness that define the organism’s very life. This is, moreover, a radi-
cally open future; it is not one of explicit planning or awaiting of a certain event, 
but a fluid and adaptive orientation that gives meaning to, and renders possible, 
the organismic responsiveness to salience.
Thirdly, and finally, the temporality of enaction is, in my view, also always-al-
ready oriented by the self-interest of the organiser, even as that self-concern is 
inherently temporal. From an enactivist perspective, it is the self-concern of the 
organism that defines and drives cognition, enabling it to exist; there would be 
no cognition, no autopoiesis, adaptivity or autonomy without or apart from the 
fundamental drive of the system to persist. This is a temporal self-concern, for 
it makes no sense without an understanding of the organism’s self-perpetuation 
through time, or of the object of that concern as self-unity with a history and a 
striving to have a future. This is also a self-concerned temporality. The temporal-
ity of enaction is of the organism and for the organism; its futurity is structured 
by the drive towards self-continuation, its pastness through the tracking of the 
organism’s trajectory of flourishing across a field of beneficial or detrimental out-
comes, and its presence through the intersection of these in the active moment 
of self-maintenance.
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Beyond pointing towards a promising conceptual sympathy between Heidegge-
rian phenomenology and the enactivist model of cognition, this tripartite inter-
section between the temporalities operating within each framework also serves 
to illuminate their shared emphasis upon the importance of temporality. For both 
perspectives, temporality is crucial to understanding the entities at the centre of 
their respective narratives, and indeed their accounts as a whole. The enactiv-
ist tradition makes this point quite overtly, particularly in its engagement with 
phenomenology. Varela himself contended that explaining our experience of time 
was “an acid test of the entire neurophenomenological enterprise”, a notion tak-
en up by many enactivist accounts - including, for example, by Evan Thompson 
in Mind in Life, arguably one of the most significant contemporary contributions 
to the discourse.41 In the case of Heidegger’s account, meanwhile, this temporal 
orientation is one that is often occluded by the tendency to focus upon the first 
division of Being and Time. While arguing for this point in detail is beyond what 
I can accomplish here, I would say that fully appreciating the potential of that 
period in Heidegger’s thought requires us to take account of the vital role that he 
ascribes to temporality in structuring all aspects of Dasein’s way of Being.42 If, as 
I suggested earlier, we can read Heidegger as claiming that temporality and pur-
posiveness are intrinsically intertwined, founding and structuring one another in 
a complex mutuality, then we cannot understand the analysis constructed in the 
first division of Being and Time¸ for example, without seeing that temporality is at 
its core—a place which it also ought to find in our readings.
In my view, this means that these discourses can be brought into a fruitful con-
versation, not only about the content of their models of temporality, but about 
the significance that they ascribe to them. On the one hand, the Heideggerian 
position that I outline above entails that any attempt to utilise Heidegger’s con-
ceptual framework in order model purposive cognition must also grapple with the 
important role that temporality plays within it. Enactivism is particularly well-
positioned to do so in light of both, its own insistence that temporality is crucial 
to investigating and explaining cognition, as well as the resonances between the 
temporal dimensions of enaction and the structures Heideggerian temporality. 
On the other hand, this deep congeniality between Heidegger’s account and en-
activism surely makes the former a particularly interesting potential interlocutor 
for a tradition like the latter that has such a long history of interest in both phe-
nomenology and the analysis of temporality. The majority of enactivist discus-
sions that connect these two fields focus mainly on the works of Husserl and, to a 
slightly lesser extent, of Merleau-Ponty; I find it puzzling that so little attention is 
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given to what a Heideggerian perspective might contribute to that dialogue.
CONCLUSION
The phenomenological tradition has been drawn into many kinds of encounters 
with the study and philosophy of cognition, including not only the now well-
known critiques of certain paths that the latter took, but also more collaborative 
interactions grounded in the hope that phenomenological insights might be in-
corporated into new ways of investigating what it means to experience and navi-
gate the world as we do. In this congenial atmosphere, the question of where Hei-
degger fits into these conversations urges itself upon us. Being and Time was, after 
all, so central in those early, more hostile interdisciplinary engagements. How 
might Heidegger’s narrative of practical engagement and Being-in-the-world situ-
ate itself within this relatively new landscape? One particularly potent way of do-
ing so, I have suggested here, would be to enter into a dialogue with the enactivist 
tradition that has grown out of Varela and Maturana’s autopoietic theory of life. 
Enactivism already carries traces of phenomenology in its blood, an inheritance 
that manifests more strongly with each new generation of texts. The compatibil-
ity of contemporary enactivism with Heidegger’s ideas has, however, rarely been 
explore. This lacuna ought to puzzle the reader of Being and Time, for there are 
such profound resonances between the two discourses that their coming together 
seems almost fated, rich with the promise of generating philosophically fruitful 
friction and mutually illuminating dialogues.
Here, I have focussed upon two nodes at which these perspectives intersect. The 
first such conceptual sympathy lies in the way in which each portrays the rela-
tion between the entities that form the protagonists of their respective analyses 
and the worlds that these entities navigates. For both, the Heidegger of Being and 
Time and the mainstream enactivist tradition, entity and world are bound in a 
complex, insoluble tangle of mutual constitution, permitting neither to be un-
derstood or, indeed, to be apart from the other. This position allies Heideggerian 
phenomenology and enactivism in the context of contemporary debates over the 
extent to which cognition merges cogniser and world. That is, they share an out-
look that rejects dichotomous interpretations of the entity-world relation while 
maintaining the view of the entity as a locus of concern for which the world is 
what it is. The second site of harmony between the discourses is grounded in 
how each views the nature and role of temporality. The model of temporality that 
Heidegger sets out in the era of Being and Time can, I contend, be read in terms of 
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three key features, that is, a complex mutual founding relation between temporal-
ity and purposiveness; an emphasis  upon a radically indeterminate futurity; and 
an inherent connection between temporality and self-concern. In my view, these 
structures can be recognised already being at work within the temporal dimen-
sion of the autopoietic enacting of meaning that enactivism describes, such that 
we can view the latter as already operating within a Heideggerian temporality. 
Each discourse’s temporal orientation can shed light upon the other through their 
mutual resonances. The importance that both assign to temporality, moreover, 
strengthens this bond; the phenomena that each seeks to explore and explain can-
not be adequately captured or accounted for without an understanding of tem-
porality. I think that these reflections offer us reason to think that, if we wish to 
pursue a dialogue between Heideggerian phenomenology and contemporary ap-
proaches to studying cognition, then we should look towards enactivist versions 
of the latter as especially promising interlocutors for the former.
—University of Melbourne
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NOTES
1. This paper is drawn from sections of my recently-submitted doctoral thesis, Dasein’s Temporal 
Enaction: Heideggerian Temporality in Dialogue with Contemporary Cognitive Science; sections 1-3 are 
from chapter 5 of that thesis, and section 4 includes partial sections of chapters 3 and 8.
2. This now-famous description of Artificial Intelligence research (and allied fields) that saw cog-
nition as fundamentally computational and symbol-manipulating first appeared in (and through-
out) the work of John Haugeland. See John Haugeland, Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press, 1985. My discussion here refers to the discourse’s shift in focus, that is, from 
the kind of phenomenologically-grounded critique of cognitive science that Dreyfus developed, to 
a developing phenomenologically-sound cognitive science. See Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers 
Can’t Do. New York: Harper and Row, 1972. This is not to say that this project—exemplified by 
the approaches of figures such as Gallagher, Noë, Wheeler, Varela and Zahavi, as well as Dreyfus 
himself—has universally replaced the more critical perspective. Most accounts undertaking the 
‘collaborative approach’ also develop phenomenology-based critiques of various models of cogni-
tion. Moreover, the ‘positive turn’ is by no means unanimously accepted, and still faces scepticism 
from a variety of perspectives.
3. Of course, this question has been posed and addressed in various ways throughout the litera-
ture—including perhaps most prominently in recent times by Michael Wheeler. See Michael 
Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. This pa-
per does not seek to negate the possibility of other viable approaches.
4. As I will note later, many enactivists who engage with phenomenology—including Francisco 
Varela and Evan Thompson, for example—mention Heidegger briefly as one of a number of phe-
nomenologists with whose views they take their tradition to have some compatibilities, often on 
the basis of what they describe as general phenomenological tendencies (such as the rejection 
of the subject/object dichotomy or the emphasis upon contextual situatedness). Heideggerian 
thought receives somewhat more attention in the ‘perceptual enactivist’ discourse, which (pri-
marily through the work of Alva Noë) built upon Varela’s claims about the importance of embod-
ied action in structuring the cogniser’s world-navigation to construct what is by now arguably a 
distinct research project that focuses exclusively on the importance of action and movement in 
perception. This is not, however, the kind of enactivism that I am interested in here. 
5. Here, and throughout this paper, I am drawing on the descriptions of enacting cognition put 
forward by the following key texts: Di Paolo, “Autopoiesis, Adaptivity, Teleology, Agency” Phenom-
enology and the Cognitive Sciences 4:4 (2006, 429-452); T. Froese and T. Ziemke, “Enactive Artifi-
cial Intelligence: Investigating the Systemic Organization of Life and Mind” Artificial Intelligence 
173:3-4 (2009, 466-500); Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Science of 
Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007; Francisco J. Varela, “Patterns of Life: Inter-
twining Identity and Cognition” Brain and Cognition 34:1 (1997, 72-87); and Francisco J. Varela, 
Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience, 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991.
6. The account offered here of enactivism’s philosophical roots draws mainly on Froese and 
Ziemke, “Enactive Artificial Intelligence”, 476-484. Significant examples of enactivist discussions 
of Jonas can be found in Thompson, Mind in Life, 149-157; and in Andreas Weber and Francisco J. 
Varela, “Life After Kant: Natural Purposes and the Autopoietic Foundations of Biological Individu-
ality” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1:2 (2002, 109-114).
7. See Froese and Ziemke, “Enactive Artificial Intelligence”, 477-478.
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8. The book (which is actually comprised of two essays, “Biology of Cognition” and “Autopoiesis: 
The Organization of the Living”) was originally published in 1972 as De Maquinas y Seres Vivos. 
The edition to which I shall refer here is its later English publication as Humberto R. Maturana 
and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. London: D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1980.
9. See Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 73-84 ff.
10. The enactivist conception of autonomy has varied significantly and controversially over the 
decades; in addition to its definition being disputed, there has been much debate over whether it 
constitutes a separate condition for cognition to autopoiesis, and whether either can be taken as 
a sub-category of the other. In this paper, I will only draw on the way it is discussed in Maturana 
and Varela’s essays. For that treatment, see for example Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cog-
nition, 80.
11. Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 79.
12. Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 73.
13. Maturana and Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition, 81.
14.See Humberto Maturana, “Preface to the second edition of De Máquinas y Seres Vivos - Autopoie-
sis: La organización de lo vivo”. Trans. Alberto Paucar-Caceres and Roger Hamden. Systems Research 
and Behavioral Science 28 (2011, 590-591); and Francisco J. Varela, “Preface to the second edition of 
De Máquinas y Seres Vivos - Autopoiesis: La organización de lo vivo”. Trans. Alberto Paucar-Caceres, 
Roger Harnden and Karina Cornejo. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 28 (2011, 611-13).
15. Naturalising Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Eds 
Jean Petitot, Francisco J. Varela, Bernard Pachoud and Jean-Michel Roy. Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1999. Varela details his engagement with phenomenology in the “Preface to the 
second edition”, 603-604.
16. My discussion of adaptivity here refers mainly to the discussion in Di Paolo, “Autopoiesis”, 
437-444.
17. Jonas engages with Heidegger primarily in terms of a critique of what he sees as the latter’s 
theological underpinnings, which Jonas thought influenced Heidegger’s focus upon the human 
instead of organisms in general. The Phenomenon of Life is nowadays often published with es-
says about Heidegger’s ‘theology’—as well as Jonas’ famous repudiation of his former mentor’s 
Nazism. See the new edition of The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology, Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001; and Di Paolo’s review, “The Phenomenon of Life, by Hans 
Jonas” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 36:3 (2005, 340-342).
18. Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Trans. 
William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, 263 [382].
19. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 261 [379].
20. Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 263 [383].
21. That these connections between Jonas, von Uexküll and Heidegger point to potential con-
nections between contemporary enactivists and Heideggerian perspectives has even been sug-
gested—albeit not yet taken up—by enactivists themselves. Froese and Ziemke mention that 
“Heidegger’s existential account of the living mode of being still deserves further study, especially 
in relation to the biological foundations of enactive cognitive science”. See Froese and Ziemke, 
“Enactive Artificial Intelligence”, 241.
22. I am not, of course, ruling out that the brevity of enactivism’s engagement with these ideas 
may be motivated by plausible doubts about their utility for enactivist approaches. One important 
potential reason for such scepticism may be that Heidegger says little about embodiment, whereas 
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this issue is central to many contemporary enactivist accounts. However, I would maintain that 
the resonances between Heidegger’s general framework and enactivism are sufficiently significant 
yet too underexplored to generate interest in a prolonged dialogue. After all, I am not suggest-
ing that Heideggerian phenomenology is the only or best interlocutor for enactivism; the need 
for dialogue between them is not built upon each being able to address all of the other’s major 
concerns, but rather upon the significance of the points at which they do intersect—particularly 
with respect to temporality. I think that, just as—for example—Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of em-
bodiment may offer enactivism insights that it cannot find in other phenomenologies, so Hei-
degger’s account of temporality can (for reasons that I can only begin to touch upon here) offer 
enactivism something unique, vital, and salient to some of its core concerns. Similarly, its existing 
intersections with enactivism may well offer a Heideggerian approach more reasons and room for 
re-imagining the role of the body within its framework. Heideggerian and enactivist discourses 
will be enriched by adding more of each other’s insights to their respective conceptual repertoires 
than they have at present.
23. The only notable exception here can be found in Fernando Ilharco’s conference paper, “Build-
ing Bridges in Phenomenology: Matching Heidegger and Autopoiesis in Interpretive Research”, 
which was presented at the Second International Workshop of the Phenomenology, Organisation 
and Technology Workgroup, at the Catholic University of Portugal in Lisbon in September 2003. 
Ilharco draws on what he takes to be phenomenological accounts of essence, language and the de-
struction of the history of ontology to link the way each discourse figures in information systems 
and interpretive organisational research.
24. Examples of such dialogues include the debate between Evan Thompson and Michael Wheeler 
in their Mind in Life symposium published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies 18:5-6 (2011). See 
also the various interactions between Wheeler and Ezequiel Di Paolo over the years, notably their 
joint paper “Existentialism and Cognitive Science” The Continuum Companion to Cognitive Science. 
Eds Jack Reynolds, Ashley Woodward and Felicity Joseph. London: Continuum, 2001, 241-25; and 
Di Paolo’s review of Wheeler’s book, “The Quiet Heideggerian”, Artificial Life 13:2 (2007). These 
get tantalisingly close to, but never fully take up, discussions of the resonances between Heideg-
gerian and enactivist approaches.
25. One significant example of this is the way that Heidegger’s analysis of Befindlichkeit has fea-
tured in the discourse. One of the few Heideggerian concepts that has been discussed frequent-
ly in enactivist literature, it features in both classic and contemporary texts in a manner that 
exemplifies the tendency to take up Heideggerian concepts while mentioning their relation to 
Heidegger’s overall account only briefly or not at all. See, for example, Francisco Varela, “The 
Specious Present: A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness” Naturalising Phenomenology: 
Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1999, 266-314; and Giovanna Colombetti, The Feeling Body. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013.
26. Throughout this section, I am drawing upon Heidegger’s discussion of Being-in-the-world and 
his contrasting of his model with other conceptions of the entity-world relation. See Martin Hei-
degger, Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford: Blackwell Publish-
ing, 2009, 78-148 [52-113]. Henceforth, all direct quotations from Being and Time will be noted as 
BT by parenthetical reference in the text. As here, these will list the page numbers of both the 
translation and the original.
27. For examples of such an account of cognition, see Di Paolo, “Autopoiesis,” 429-452ff; Froese 
and Ziemke, “Enactive Artificial Intelligence,” 466-500; Thompson, Mind in Life, 3-165ff, especially 
3-87; Evan Thompson, “Life and Mind: From Autopoiesis to Neurophenomenology. A Tribute to 
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Francisco Varela,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2004): 381-398; Steve Torrance, “In 
Search of the Enactive: Introduction to the Special Issue on Enactive Experience,” Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences 4, no. 4 (2006): 357-368ff; and Varela, Thompson and Rosch, The Embod-
ied Mind.
28. This is point is often made by enactivists discussing their tradition’s emphasis upon the al-
ways-already situatedness of the cogniser. For a particularly illuminating discussion, see Ezequiel 
Di Paolo, “Extended Life” Topoi 28:1 (2008, 15-20). 
29. Situating enactivism like this is admittedly somewhat controversial, for some participants in 
that tradition (such as Di Paolo) have contended that enactivism should be seen as either allied to, 
or even more radical than, extended or distributed models of cognition. See Di Paolo, “Extended 
Life”, 9-21; and Michael Wheeler, “Mind in Life or Life in Mind?” Journal of Consciousness Studies 
18:5-6 (2011, 148-167).
30. Accounts connecting Heidegger’s model of temporality with the enactivist tradition have, I 
think, often come very close to being realised, without ever fully being pursued. One good ex-
ample of what I mean here is provided by Varela himself, since he notes that the Husserlian model 
of temporal experience that constitutes his primary phenomenological source is not always useful 
or sufficiently developed, whereas Heidegger had “a great deal to say about the topic.” See Varela, 
“The Specious Present”, 297. Indeed, he later draws upon Heidegger’s accounts of absorption in 
practical engagement, the un-ready-to-hand, and Befindlichkeit; however, instead of considering 
what Heidegger had to say about these elements’ connection to temporality, he does not pursue 
the idea. Ilharco’s paper, mentioned earlier, once again is notable for at least suggesting this con-
nection, offering a short paragraph of analysis.
31. The limitations of scope and space here mean that I will not be able to offer a detailed account 
of Heidegger’s different temporal concepts, such as Weltzeit or Temporalität.
32. For Heidegger’s discussion of horizons here, see BT, 415-418 [364-366].
33. Heidegger defines the Um-zu throughout his discussion of Being-in-the-world; see especially 
BT, 95-102 [66-72].
34. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1988, 377 [267].
35. Heidegger discusses this openness of temporality and the importance of the horizonal nature 
of ecstatic temporality in underlying transcendence throughout the various parts of his account 
of temporality. See particularly BT, 415-418 [364-366]; Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenom-
enology, 412-429 [291-302]; and Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Trans. 
Michael Heim. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992, 136-216 ff [170-280 ff].
36. William Blattner, Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
117.
37. See, for example, BT, 385-386 [336].
38. Heidegger hints at this in places like BT, 285-286 [336-337].
39. See, for example,  BT, 285-286 [336-337].
40. Di Paolo makes this point particularly insightfully when he argues in favour of adding a notion 
of adaptivity to enactivist definition of cognition, contending that such a fluid concept is crucial 
to capturing the dynamics of life in terms of a “multi-scaled and directed temporality”. For him, 
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